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ABSTRACT
This paper demonstrates that vertically aligned private or public organizations
are capable of generating strategic trade advantage similar to that acquired through
direct government export subsidization. The model considers two forms of vertical
coordination that lead to advantageous trade positions in international markets: upstream vertical restraint and downstream equity sharing. Such practices are commonly employed both by state trading agencies and by private firms in nations with
lenient antitrust laws. The finding has important implications under new World
Trade Organization (WTO) rules intended to reduce government intervention in international transactions. Recent reforms in the WTO favor nations that sanction
highly refined vertical linkages between firms, while nations with stringent antitrust
legislation have an incentive to negotiate for greater harmonization of international
laws.
I.

INTRODUCTION

GJLOBALLY traded goods are often produced in vertically structured economic sectors in which a final product is developed through a series of
transactions between upstream suppliers of inputs and downstream producers, intermediaries, and retailers. In many nations, vertical transactions in a
chain of production are arranged through highly coordinated linkages between firms. The celebrated Japanese keiretsu and the less familiar Korean
chaebols are examples of industrial structures that involve linked equity interests of vertically aligned corporations.1 The success of such vertically co* The authorswould like to thankJamesBrander,Yang-MingChang,Kala Krishna,Jeffrey Perloff,Roger McEowen,and an anonymousrefereefor helpfulcomments.
' The cross-shareholding
featurebetweenverticalstagesof keiretsuorganizationshas been
associatedwith improvedproductquality,relaxedfinancialrestrictionson new plantinvestment, greatermarketpenetration,increasedincidencesof dumping,and reductionsin new
firmentryand survival.For cross shareholdingandproductquality,see DavidFlath,Vertical
Integrationby Meansof ShareholdingInterlocks,7 Int'l J. Indus.Org. 369 (1989). For evidence of relaxed financialrestrictions,see Rene Belderdos& Leo Sleuwaegen,Japanese
Firmsandthe Decision to InvestAbroad:BusinessGroupsand RegionalCoreNetworks,78
Rev. Econ. & Stat. 214 (1996). For market penetrationand dumping, see LeonardK.
Cheng& MordechaiE. Kreinin,SupplierPreferencesandDumping:An Analysisof Japanese
CorporateGroups,63 S. Econ. J. 51 (1996). For an analysisof de novo firmentryand sur[ Journalof Law and Economics,vol. XLIII(April2000)]
? 2000 by The Universityof Chicago.All rightsreserved.0022-2186/2000/4301-0006$01.50
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ordinatedindustrystructuresis widely recognizedin internationalmarkets.2
Anothercommonformof verticalcoordinationis arrangedthroughgovernmentmarketingboards,whichdirectlycontrolthe internaltransferpricebetween upstreamproducersand downstreamretailingagents. Examplesinclude the single-deskselling systemsof statetradingenterprisessuch as the
Canadianand AustralianWheatBoards,which typicallypurchasegrain at
below-marketprices, then reimbursecommodityproducerswith a shareof
profitsin the downstreaminternationalmarkets.This paperexamines the
strategictradeimplicationsof these and otherverticallycoordinatedindustry structures.
The model demonstratesthatnationswith lenientantitruststandardshave
a strategictradeadvantagein internationalmarkets.This resultis not driven
by returnsto scale or by differencesin productiveefficiency;rather,it is
built solely on the benefitsderivedby downstreamfirmsthatemploybackward linkages as precommitmentmechanisms.3However, unlike the outcome of a governmentsubsidizationprogram,in which the noncooperative
Nash equilibriumis characterizedby multilateralexportpromotionand a
reductionin the welfare of producingnations, unilateralprecommitment
outcomesoccurwhen legal restrictionswithina rivalnationprohibitprivate
mechanismsfor verticalcontrol.The implicationsof the model are thusimportantboth in the formationof antitrustpolicy and in the negotiationof
free-tradeagreements.If internationalrestrictionsare imposed to reduce
governmentpromotionof exports, as currentlysanctionedby the World
Trade Organization(WTO), unilateralprecommitmentstrategiesare still
possible up to the limits imposed by national(and international)antitrust
laws.
vival, see David D. Li & ShanLi, A Theoryof CorporateScope andFinancialStructure,51
J. Fin. 691 (1996).
2 See, for example,VincentCable, The New TradeAgenda:UniversalRules amid CulturalDiversity,72 Int'l Affairs227 (1996); andDavidFlath,The KeiretsuPuzzle, 10 J. Japanese & Int'l Econ. 101 (1996).
3 In this regard,our model is relatedto strategictrademodels that examine the profitfor exportpromotion.See, for example,James
shiftingeffect of governmentprecommitment
MarketShareRivalry,
A. Brander& BarbaraJ. Spencer,ExportSubsidiesand International
18 J. Int'l Econ. 83 (1985);GiovanniMaggi,StrategicTradePolicieswithEndogenousMode
of Competition,86 Am. Econ. Rev. 237 (1996);and Kyle Bagwell & RobertW. Staiger,The
Sensitivityof Strategicand CorrectiveR&D Policy in OligopolisticIndustries,36 J. Int'l
for strategictradepolicy have
Econ. 133 (1994). The implicationsof verticalarrangements
been examinedby BarbaraJ. Spencer& RonaldW. Jones,VerticalForeclosureand InternationalTradePolicy, 58 Rev. Econ. Stud. 153 (1991); and BarbaraJ. Spencer& RonaldW.
Jones,TradeandProtectionin VerticallyRelatedMarkets,32 J. Int'l Econ. 31 (1992). These
latterstudies,which analyzeimporterand exporterpolicies when an upstreamfirmsupplies
inputsto a domesticand/ora foreignfinal goods producer,considerthe role of government
as an arbiterin internationaltransactions,and they do not examinethe effect of legal and
institutionalstructureon tradeoutcomes.
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Existing analyses in the internationaltrade literaturetypically presume
that only governmentsare capable of generatingprecommitmentmechanisms to capturestrategictrade benefits. To the best of our knowledge,
there has been no analysis of strategictrade incentives in the context of
private precommitmentmechanisms. The omission is rather surprising
modgiven thatthese methodsare well definedin firm-levelprincipal-agent
els.4 These papersfocus on the case in which strategicprecommitmentis
accomplishedthroughdelegationwithin a single institution.Ourpaperdeviates from this frameworkto considerthe case of arm's-lengthtransaction
in which the agent signingthe contractremainsa separatecorporateentity.
The formalstructureis thus similarto thatexaminedin the verticalseparation literature,thoughunique connectionsare made here between vertical
structure,antitrustlaw, and internationaltrade.5In particular,the present
analysisconsidersthe case in which exchangethatoccursbetweenfirmsis
subjectto review by a nationalantitrustauthority,and,consequently,highly
refinedverticallinkagesmay be allowed in some nationswhile prohibited
in others.6
Currentantitruststandardsvary widely across nations. In the United
Statesand in most EuropeanUnion (E.U.) nations,for example,legislation
governing vertically coordinatedtransactions(hereafter,vertical antitrust
law) limits the formationof vertical arrangementssuch as keiretsu and
chaebolsand encumbersthe developmentof government-sanctioned
export
marketingboards.The E.U. has recentlyworkedtowardharmonizationin
a system of minimal merger control regulationsand intends to expand
harmonizationprinciplesto CentralEuropean,east European,and Mediterraneannations. However, many other countries,particularlythose in
developingregions, still lack a sophisticatedlegal system governinganticompetitivebehavior.7Indeed, as Ernst-UlrichPetersmannnotes, the cur4

See, for example,JohnVickers,Delegationand the Theoryof the Firm,95 Econ.J. 138
(1985); ChaimFershtman& KennethL. Judd,EquilibriumIncentivesin Oligopoly,77 Am.
Econ. Rev. 927 (1987); Steven D. Sklivas, The StrategicChoice of ManagerialIncentives,
18 RANDJ. Econ. 452 (1987); and David Reitman,Stock Optionsand the StrategicUse of
ManagerialIncentives,83 Am. Econ. Rev. 513 (1993).
5 For
greaterdetail on the potentialeffects of verticalseparation,see Y. JosephLin, Oligopoly andVerticalIntegration:Note, 78 Am. Econ. Rev. 251 (1988); GiacomoBonanno&
JohnVickers,VerticalSeparation,36 J. Indus.Econ. 257 (1988); AnneT. Coughlin& Birger
Wernerfelt,On CredibleDelegationby Oligopolists:A Discussionof DistributionChannel
Management,35 Mgmt.Sci. 226 (1989); andKai-UweKuhn,NonlinearPricingin Vertically
RelatedDuopolies,28 RAND J. Econ. 37 (1997).
6 Direct integrationmay be possible in some cases, althougha proposedmergerbetween
upstreamand downstreamproducersis also likely to involve antitrustscrutiny.
7 The movementtowardinternational
harmonizationof antitrustlaw is still in its infancy.
In 1993,a draftof the internationalantitrustcode (DIAC),whichoutlinesvariousper se laws
and rules of reason on horizontaland verticalrestraints,was providedto the WTO. See
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rent degree of antitrustcooperationamongnationsis "widely regardedas
inadequate,"andthe possibilityof an emergingworldwidecompetitionauthority"is not a politicallyrealisticshortor medium-termoption."8
The body of antitrustlaw thatgovernsverticaltransactionsmay play an
importantrole in determiningthe sourceof comparativeadvantagealong a
productionchain. Specifically,tradedistortionsmay emergethroughasymmetricantitrustlegislationas nationsthatallow highly refinedverticallinkages gain comparativeadvantagein the productionof finishedgoods while
nationswith stringentantitrustlaws acquirecomparativeadvantagein the
productionof raw materials.Given the fact that downstreamindustriesare
typicallyhigh-value-addedstages of production,the sourceof comparative
advantagein verticallystructuredsectorsis of particularpolicy concern.
The remainderof the paperis organizedas follows: Section II presents
a theoreticalmodel of internationaltrade in a verticallystructuredsector
composedof a competitiveupstreamraw materialindustryand an oligopolistic downstreamfinal goods market.Section IIIpresentsour analysisregardingtwo primaryforms of verticalcontrol:upstreamverticalrestraint
anddownstreamequity sharing.Section IV discusses implicationsfor policy analysis,and Section V concludes.
II. THEFORMAL
MODEL
Themodel considersa verticallystructuredsector composedof a competitive upstreamraw-materialindustry and an imperfectlycompetitive
downstreamproducerof a final good. The raw-materialindustryin each
countryproducesa homogeneousinputat constantmarginalcost, c, which
is sold to a single downstreamfirmand costlessly transformedvia a Leontieftechnologyinto homogeneousoutputof a finalgood.9The finalgood is
thensold in an internationalmarket,composedof a domesticand a foreign
firm,which are labeledfirms 1and 2, respectively.
UnitedNations, The Role of CompetitionPolicy in EconomicReformsin Developing or
OtherCountries(1993). Ernst-UlrichPetersmann,
International
CompetitionRules for Governmentsandfor PrivateBusiness:A TradeLaw Approachfor LinkingTradeandCompetitionRules in the WTO,in PublicPolicy andGlobalTechnologicalIntegration(FrederickM.
Abbott& David J. Gerbereds. 1997), providesan excellent summaryof existing internationalantitrustlaw in the WTO.
8Petersmann, supra note 7, at 243-44.

9These restrictionsare imposedpurelyfor expositionalconvenience.With constantmarginalcost in the upstreamindustry,the strategicmotive to form contractsis isolatedfrom
theincentiveof downstreamfirms to develop backwardrelationsto reduceefficiencyloss.
Foran analysisof suchincentives,see MartinK. Perry,VerticalIntegration:
The Monopsony
Case,68 Am. Econ. Rev. 561 (1978).WithLeontieftechnologyin the downstreamindustry,
themodel abstractsfrom issues of inputsubstitutability.
Extensionof the model to consider
moregeneralrelationshipsin eitherdirectionwould be relativelystraightforward.
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Strategic interaction between the firms is modeled as a three-stage game,
the timing of which is described as follows. In the first stage, the contract
stage, the domestic downstream firm writes an observable and nonrenegotiable contract with one or more of its input suppliers. The contract specifies
the wholesale price of the input w, the upstream firms share of downstream
profits oa, and/or a fixed transfer F. In the second stage, the acceptance
stage, the upstream supplier either accepts or rejects the contract. If the contract is rejected, then the domestic firm purchases the input on the spot market at marginal cost c. In the third and final stage, the output stage, the
domestic and foreign firms compete in an international Cournot-Nash
oligopoly.
Such a sequence of events accords well with the contract design of marketing agents in State Trading Enterprises. For example, prior to harvest
each year, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) announces initial procurement prices for Canadian grains, which are typically set at 75-80 percent
of the forecasted international prices. At the end of the marketing season,
final payments are made to producers based on proceeds from international
sales. Such procurement contracts are legally binding in the short run, although the long-run acceptance of the contracts, and indeed of the institutional structure of the CWB itself, depends critically on the ability of the
agency to provide sufficient final payments to compensate producers for
their initial losses on below-market sales of grain.
Throughout, we confine attention to a domestic downstream firm that is
legally allowed to establish vertical control of the upstream market through
the contractual arrangement described above, while the foreign firm operates under the auspices of an antitrust authority that does not allow the formation of procurement contracts. That is, the foreign firm is constrained to
purchase inputs in the spot market at marginal cost c.
Let Q represent industry output of the final good and denote the downstream inverse demand function as P(Q), which is assumed throughout to
be strictly decreasing and twice continuously differentiable. Furthermore,it
is assumed that

P'(Q) + QP"(Q) < O,

(1)

which ensures the existence of equilibrium and implies that outputs are strategic substitutes.1?
The model is solved using backward induction. Accordingly, the output
stage is solved first, followed by the acceptance and contract stages, respectively. If the upstream firm accepts the contract proposed by the domestic
10 William Novshek, On the Existence of Coumot Equilibrium, 52 Rev. Econ. Stud. 85
(1985).
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downstream firm, then the objective function of the downstream firm in the
output stage is
r i(q~, Q, a, w, F) = (1 - a)(P(Q) - w)q~ - F.

(2)

Maximizing (2) with respect to output yields the following necessary condition:

P(Q) + qlP'(Q) - w = 0.

(3)

The foreign firm's objective function in the output stage is
7;(2,

Q) = (P(Q) - c)q2,

which is associated with the first-order condition
P(Q) + q2P'(Q) - c = 0.

(4)

In the output stage, the level of output per firm and total industry output,
which are denoted qi(w, c), where i = 1, 2, and Q(w, c), respectively, are
obtained by solving (3) and (4). Totally differentiating these equations
yields the ratio of comparative statics associated with the domestic firm's
choice of w,
3q2(w

c)/3w

~qi(w, c)/cw

_

P'(Q) + q2P"(Q)
2P'(Q) + q2P"(Q)

which is negative given (1).
In the acceptance stage, the upstream firm is willing to accept the contract proposed by the domestic downstream firm provided it receives a payment no less than its opportunity costs. Given that the upstream industry is
perfectly competitive, these opportunity costs can be normalized to zero
without loss of generality. As a result, the upstream firm accepts the contract proposed by the downstream firm whenever the following participation
constraint is satisfied:
(w - c)ql(w, c) + F + a[P(Q(w, c)) - w]qi(w, c) ' O.

(6)

In the contract stage, the downstream firm chooses the terms of the contract so as to maximixe profits in (2) subject to the participation constraint
(6) and the output stage solutions above. Substituting the output stage solutions into (2) and (6), the contracting problem can be written as
max 7el(w, a, F) = (1 - c)[P(Q(w, c)) - w]ql(w, c) - F
w,a,F

subject to
(w - c)ql(w, c) + F + a[P(Q(w, c)) - w]ql(w, c) ' O.
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Substitution of the constraint results in the following unconstrained
problem:

max7hi(w)= [P(Q(w,c)) - c]ql(w, c).

(7)

w

Suppressingsome of the output-stagesolution notation,differentiationof
(7) with respectto w gives the necessaryconditionfor a profit-maximizing
contract,

' c) = 0.
(P(Q) - c) )q~(w,c) + qp,(oQ) Q(w,
aw
aw

(8)

Next, divide (8) throughby [3(w, c)]/3w, substitute [3Q(w, c)]/3w =
.i=l.2[Oqi(w,

c)]/Ow,

andthenlet aq2/aql(q2,

Q) =

[cqq2(w,

c)/Ow]/[aql(w,

c)/3w] denote the ratio of comparativestaticsgiven in (5). Makinguse of
this expression,if q* and Q* representthe equilibriumlevels of firm2 output andindustryoutput,respectively,then firm l's equilibriumlevel of output, q*, must satisfy

P(Q*) - c + q*P'(Q*) 1 + 3^ (q* ,2*) = ?
3ql
Using expression(4), firm2's equilibriumlevel of outputsatisfies
P(Q*) - c + q*P'(Q*)= 0.

(9)

(10)

The equilibriumlevels of outputfor the domesticand foreignfirmare thus
obtainedby substitutingQ* = q* + q* into (9) and (10) and solving these
two equationssimultaneously.
To determinethe equilibriumchoice of w, denotedw*, the ouputsolution
(9) is substitutedinto (3), which obtains

w* - c = -q* P'(Q*)~q2(q*,Q*)< 0,
aq\

(11)

wherethe inequalityholds by (1) and (5). Thus,the optimalcontractby the
downstreamfirmspecifiesthatthe upstreamfirmsell inputsat a loss to the
downstreamfirm.
III. BACKWARD
ANDSTRATEGIC
LINKAGES
TRADE
This section examinestwo types of contractualrelations:upstreamvertical restraintand downstreamequity sharing.Each form of verticalcontrol
is a special case of the above model. For the case of upstreamverticalrestraint,the downstreamfirmcompensatesthe inputsupplierfor selling at a
loss by paying a fixed transfer(thatis, az = 0 and F > 0), while, for the
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case of downstreamequity sharing,compensationis made with a shareof
profits(thatis, oc> 0 and F = O).11
A. The Case of an UpstreamVerticalRestraint
In many nations,governmentmarketingboardsand privatefirmsimplementvariousforms of upstreamverticalrestraintto directlyorchestratethe
pricingbehaviorof upstreamsuppliers.Such explicit control of prices in
affiliatedstages of production,whetherimplementedbackwardor forward,
poses legal challenge in other nations.In the United States, for example,
thereare actuallyseveralrelatedantitrustissues governingverticalrelationships.12Most directly,a claim may be made againstthe downstreamfirm
for imposinga verticalrestraint.13
In addition,if morethanone downstream
firmproducesin a region of antitrustauthority,both upstreamand downstreamfirmsmay be consideredin violationof price discriminationlaw if
theupstreamfirmdoes not chargeidenticalpricesin transactionswith rival
downstreamproducers.14
Even in the case of a single upstreamfirm and a
singledownstreamfirm,moreover,a verticalrestraintis in violationof U.S.
antitrustlaw if the contractualarrangementis deemed to create an entry
barrier.15

Forthe case of upstreamverticalrestraint,the downstreamfirmcompensatesthe input supplierfor selling at a loss in expression(11) throughthe
11Note that there are also many possible combinations of profit sharing and fixed transfers
thatthe downstream firm can use to compensate the upstream firm for selling inputs at a loss
to the downstream firm. For example, it is possible to combine these two forms of vertical
control in various systems of "impure" equity sharing that involve both a fixed revenue
transferand a share of downstream profits.
12Jeffrey M. Perloff, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, & Paul Ruud, Antitrust Settlements and Trial
Outcomes, 78 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 401 (1996), identifies 13 antitrust categories based on U.S.
settlement and trial outcomes, several of which generally apply.
13 Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Group Life & Health
InsuranceCo. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); and Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968).
14 The U.S. courts have held downstream firms
culpable for receiving the benefits of discriminatoryprices in Federal Trade Commission v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968);
andBoise Cascade Corp., No. 9133 (F.T.C., November 1, 1990). Inthe case of vertical restraints,a single firm contracting for a lower price with an upstream producer would not be
consideredto have the requisite anticompetitive effect on market power under Section 2 of
theSherman Act unless there is also evidence of monopsony power in the industry. See Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, 518 F.
Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1981), aff'd, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982).
15See William P. Bivins Jr.,Texaco v. Hasbrouck: The Supreme Court Reviews FunctionalDiscounts under the Robinson-Patman Act, 36 Antitrust Bull. 413 (1991).
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payment of a fixed transfer, F. If a is set equal to zero in the above model,
then the participation constraint (6) implies that the optimal payment (that
is, the minimum sufficient payment) is given by
F* = (c- w*)q*.

(12)

Through use of (12), the downstream firm is thus able to use the upstream
vertical restraint as a mechanism to create a credible output expansion in
the final goods market by restructuringproduction costs between fixed and
marginal cost components. The upstream price restraint, which stipulates a
below-marginal-cost input price in the domestic upstream market, thereby
precommits the domestic firm to an ex post beneficial output expansion in
the downstream international market.
B. The Case of Downstream Equity Sharing
It is well known that vertical control can be arranged in various institutional forms. In conventional circumstances of retail vertical restraint (for
example, resale price maintenance), a producer can solve various retail externality problems, often equivalently, through franchising and exclusive
territories,through quantity forcing, and through direct integration of retail
units. Similarly, the strategic advantage gained by employment of an upstream vertical restraint, as outlined above, may be accomplished with a
backwardcontract that relies on equity sharing in the downstream industry.
As David Flath demonstrates, vertically related Coumot-Nash oligopolies
produce a greater level of output when upstream firms own equity shares of
downstreamfirms.16However, linked equity interests violate antitrustlaw in
certainnations. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against DuPont
holding a stock interest in General Motors on the basis that DuPont's ownership share allowed it to sell paint and fabric on grounds other than "competitive merit."17 Similar vertical antitrust laws regarding equity-sharing
arrangementsalso exist among most E.U. members, while other nations
such as Japan, Korea, China, and Brazil allow linked equity interests in vertically structured sectors.18
Undera system of downstream equity sharing, the downstream firm compensates the upstream firm with a share of profits in the international mar-

i6 Flath, supra note 2.
17United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956).

'8For a comparative assessment of U.S. and Japanese antitrust law, see Hiroshi
Iyori &
Akinori Uesugi, The Antimonopoly Laws and Policies of Japan(1994).
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ket. Makingthe restrictionF = 0 in the above model,the participationconstraint(6) implies thatthe minimumsize of the equity shareis equal to
a* =

c -- w*

cw
P(Q*) - w*
Substituting(3) and (11) into (13) resultsin the following:
a* =

q2(q,,

Q*).

(13)

(14)

3ql

Equations(1), (5), and (10) togetherensurethat a* lies betweenzero and
one, which implies that the contractcan be interpretedas a profit-sharing
contract.'9
The idea that equity sharingcan be used as a strategicmechanismin a
competitive upstreamindustryis related to the incentive for delegation
within a single institution.As observedby ChaimFershtmanand Kenneth
Judd,the owner of a firmhas an incentiveto distorthis or her manager's
incentives(for instance,towardsales insteadof profitmaximization)whenOuranalysisreever the reactionof the owner'scompetitorsis beneficial.20
veals a similarresultherein the case of arm's-lengthtransaction.A vertical
contractthat transfersa shareof downstreamequity to the upstreamfirm
provides a method of precommitmentthat is equivalentto that acquired
throughthe use of an upstreampricerestraint.The use of verticalcontracts
to acquirestrategicadvantage,therefore,is quiterobustto alternativemethods of compensationbetweenupstreamand downstreamfirms.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS
FORPOLICYANALYSIS

The control of upstreamproductiondecisions, either throughupstream
verticalrestraintor throughdownstreamequity sharing,resultsin an outcome similarto thatacquiredthroughdirectgovernmentexportpromotion.
However, unlike the case of export subsidization,in which the best response strategyof a foreigngovernmentis a countervailingsubsidy,unilateral outcomesare maintainedwhen verticalantitrustlaw is not sufficiently
harmonizedacross nations or when certain nations employ government
marketingagentswhile othersdo not. The enforcementof verticalantitrust

l9 In a context of labor contracts, Bernard Bensaid & Robert J. Gary-Bobo, Negotiation
of Profit-Sharing Contracts in Industry, 35 Eur. Econ. Rev. 1069 (1991), derives a similar
result for the symmetric case of n firms under conditions of linear demand. The derivation
provided here is more general and can readily be extended to consider the symmetric n firm
case.
20 Fershtman & Judd, supra note 4.
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laws within a nation, in fact, may provide the very mechanism by which
firms in a rival nation are able to acquire and maintain strategic advantage
in the international market. Irregularities between downstream firms in the
ability to establish backward linkages can thus create asymmetry between
nations in the balance of trade.
Differences between nations in antitrust laws may also affect comparative advantage in vertically structured sectors. If downstream firms capitalize on legal opportunities for upstream vertical control, then nations with
lenient vertical antitrust laws may gain comparative advantage in the production of finished products. Conversely, a trade competitor with restrictive vertical antitrust laws may have comparative advantage in the production of raw commodities and truncate the chain of vertical production at
the upstream level. The source of comparative advantage in vertically
structuredsectors is an important policy concern for governments that wish
to maintain domestic downstream industries and attract foreign investment
in high-value-added stages of production. An implication of this paper is
that enforcing restrictive vertical antitrust laws at the national level may be
inconsistent with such objectives.
Another implication of the model is that a uniform relaxation of antitrust
laws across nations generates a procompetitive effect. When contractual relations are allowed to develop in both domestic and foreign nations, a noncooperative Nash equilibrium arises in which the formation of a vertical
contract is a best-response strategy to contracting by a rival firm. Thus, vertical coordination is likely to occur multilaterally in environments with
relaxed vertical antitrust legislation, even though such actions reduce aggregate profit in the downstream industry. In the present context, the procompetitive effect of such multilateral contractual relations would lead to
an enhancement of global welfare, as the formation of highly refined linkages between firms expands global production, reduces the price of the final
good, and thereby increases social surplus.
V.

CONCLUDINGCOMMENTS

The existing literature on strategic trade theory focuses primarily on the
role of government intervention in redirecting firm-level behavior to
welfare-improving trade equilibria. In this paper, we have explored a much
different characterization of strategic trade in which the only role of a nation's regulator is to determine the legal boundaries that govern firm behavior through the establishment of national antitrust policy.
The paper has demonstrated the ability of downstream firms or government marketing boards to employ backward linkages with affiliated upstream producers to generate strategic advantage in export markets. Alter-

154

THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

native systems of upstream price restraints and downstream equity sharing
were shown to be consistent with profit maximization in each stage of production. In the context of nonharmonized vertical antitrust legislation, the
paper has demonstrated that backward linkages improve the strategic position of firms that operate in nations without legal impediment to vertical
control. Thus, antitrust laws, which have ironically been shown to decrease
welfare in many different contexts, also adversely affect domestic profitability and reduce export volume in international markets.2'
Future international trade negotiations are likely to focus on ways to further limit government intrusion in global markets. An importantimplication
of the paper is that nations with restrictive vertical antitrustlegislation have
an incentive to establish greater harmonization of international laws. Vertical antitrustlegislation is strategically disadvantageous to a nation in that it
limits the establishment of backward linkages with upstream producers as
precommitment mechanisms in export markets.
Previous studies have suggested that, eventually, global trade may fall
under a general set of harmonized competition policies.22 In order for this
to occur, a greater understandingis needed about the importance of antitrust
harmonization. The findings in this paper address these questions for the
subset of antitrust law pertaining to vertically structuredeconomic sectors.
An implication of the paper is that nations with stringent regulations governing vertical transactions have an incentive to negotiate for further harmonization of international antitrust laws.
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